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WHEN ARE LAW AND ECONOMICS ISOMORPHIC? 
A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin oflittle minds, 
adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. 
With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essay on Self-Reliance (1841) 
INTRODUCTION 
[Vol. 39 
The legal community generally views the way in which judges de-
cide cases as a rational decision process. However, the concept of judi-
cial rationality is ambiguous, because judges use two rational decision 
processes: legal rationality and economic rationality. Legal rationality is 
based on the principle of precedent, or stare decisis, which requires that 
judges decide like cases alike. Judges determine whether cases are like 
or distinguishable through the construction of legal classifications and 
through recognition of factual similarities and differences. I 
Economic rationality is based on economic optimization theory,2 
which requires that judges balance competing interests through marginal 
trade-offs as in cost-benefit analysis. In the law of torts, Judge Learned 
Hand's negligence test (B < PL) is a specific example of cost-benefit 
analysis: the optimal level of care occurs when the marginal cost of acci-
dent prevention (B) equals the marginal benefit from reduced damage 
(PL). According to Judge Richard Posner, Judge Hand's negligence test 
illustrates a "pervasive" isomorphic relationship between legal doctrine 
and economic theory.3 
I KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH chs. III-IV (1960); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-27 (1948). 
2 Economic optimization theory is the theory that economic actors, whether individuals or 
firms, behave so as to maximize or optimize their goals, such as satisfaction or utility for individuals 
or profit for firms. Cost-benefit analysis is an example of economic optimization. In tort cases in-
volving accidents, cost-benefit analysis assumes that the behavior of individuals or firms is less than 
optimal as long as the marginal benefit in terms of the reduction of accident damage from an in-
crease in the level of precaution or care taken to avoid an accident exceeds the marginal cost from 
that increase in the level of care. When the marginal benefit from additional precaution just equals 
the marginal cost of that additional precaution, the level of precaution or care is optimal. Conversely, 
if the marginal cost of additional precaution exceeds the marginal benefit from a reduction of acci-
dent damage from additional precaution, the level of precaution or care is greater than optimal. 
3 Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of the Expert Witness, 13 J. OF ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 91 (1999) ("There is a remarkable isomorphism between legal doctrine and economic 
theory .... The isomorphic relation is illustrated by Judge Learned Hand's formula of negligence in 
United States v. Carroll Towing co. [159 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 19470] .... There are many other impor-
tant examples of isomorphism between legal doctrine and economic theory; indeed, I regard it as 
2
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An isomorphic relationship exists between law and economics if 
concepts from one discipline can be mapped onto the other in a way that 
preserves the properties and results of operations in both disciplines.4 
The Judge Hand test exemplifies an isomorphism between law and eco-
nomics. In tort law, whenever the economic relation B < PL is satisfied 
in a negligence case, the case corresponds to or can be mapped into the 
legal category of "negligence." Conversely, whenever the economic re-
lation B ~ PL exists in a negligence case, the case corresponds to or can 
be mapped into the legal category of "due care." In other words, whether 
they apply legal rationality (did the actor use reasonable care?) or eco-
nomic rationality (is B < PL?) to the negligence issue in the case, judges 
will reach the same conclusion.5 
Although Judge Posner has asserted that examples of isomorphism 
between law and economics are "pervasive,,,6 in other contexts, he has 
denigrated legal reasoning and placed it in a subordinate position to eco-
nomic reasoning.7 Other law and economics scholars also tend to argue 
that law should adopt the methodology and the efficiency goal of eco-
nomics.8 Economists tend to think that economic rationality is the only 
rational decision process. However, legal reasoning is a separate and dis-
tinct rational decision process that is sometimes consistent (isomorphic) 
with economic rationality and sometimes inconsistent with economic ra-
tionality. When these two rational decision processes conflict, economic 
rationality should not be automatically preferred. 
This article answers three questions: first, how does "thinking like a 
pervasive."). 
4 ROSEMARY HIRSCHFELDER & JOHN HIRSCHFELDER, INTRODUCTION TO DISCRETE 
MATHEMATICS 139,221 (1991). 
5 For example, assume that a driver of an automobile, who habitually runs red lights when-
ever he is within 50 feet of the light when it turns red, has a 10% increased probability of getting into 
an auto accident than someone who does not run red lights in similar circumstances. This is P in the 
Judge Hand test. Further assume that if an accident occurs in such circumstances, it will on average 
cause $5,000 worth of economic damage. This is L. Lastly, assume that the additional economic cost 
to the driver in terms of delay he would experience from not running red lights is $50. This is B. 
According to the Judge Hand test, B ($50) < P (10%) x L($5,000) = $500; therefore, the driver who 
habitually runs red lights has used an inefficiently low level of care because his actions save him on 
average $50 every time he runs a red light but cost society $500 on average. His low level of care is 
both negligent in terms of economics and less than due care in terms of the "reasonably prudent per-
son" standard oflaw. 
6 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998). 
7 RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 73 (2003) ("There is no in-
trinsic or fundamental difference between how a judge approaches a legal problem and how a busi-
ness man approaches a problem of production or marketing." In general, Posner prefers pragmatism 
to precedent.); RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF 
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 24,28,66 (2006) (discussed in Section V.C). 
8 STEVEN SHA YELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW ch. 28 (2004). 
3
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lawyer" (or ajudge) differ from "thinking like an economist"? Section I 
defines the three essential elements that a rational decision process, 
whether economic or legal, must have. Section II defines the standard 
model of economic rationality, what thinking like an economist means, 
in terms of two principles and their symbolic interpretation as binary re-
lations. Two properties of the binary relations, completeness and transi-
tivity, are shown to be essential characteristics of what it means to think 
like an economist. 
In Section III, the classic Tussman & tenBroek model is discussed 
because it is a specific precursor to the general model of legal rationality 
presented in this article. In the Tussman & tenBroek model, equal-
protection categories and relations from constitutional law are described 
with Venn diagrams. In order to show that the Tussman & tenBroek 
model is a precursor to the general model of legal rationality, its Venn 
diagrams are translated into binary relations, the translation of which al-
lows their model to be generalized. 
Section IV.A presents a model of legal rationality in a manner that 
parallels and can be compared to the model of economic rationality. Le-
gal rationality is defined in terms of two principles and their interpreta-
tion as binary relations. Two properties of binary relations, incomplete-
ness and transitivity, are shown to be essential characteristics of what it 
means to think like a lawyer. 
The question of what it means to think like a lawyer or judge in-
cludes the question, what is the role of precedent in legal rationality? 
Section IV.B shows how courts are constrained by stare decisis from 
employing over-inclusive rules of law in order to retain the freedom to 
distinguish future cases. 
In Section IV.C, legal rationality is shown to be characterized by 
multiple rules of case law. The crucial question is whether legal rational-
ity's rules of case law are discrete and unrelated to each other or nested 
(completely included) within broader rules of law such as due process, 
equity, or equal protection. The answer to this question determines 
whether the principle of precedent is a weak or a strong constraint on un-
der-inclusive decisions; under-inclusive decisions may eviscerate stare 
decisis by distinguishing a case on spurious grounds. 
In Section IV.D, it is shown that both economic rationality and legal 
rationality include theories that conclude that case law tends toward rules 
that are optimal in the sense that cases involving rules that are less than 
optimal are more likely to be "selected" for litigation. In economic ra-
tionality, the common law becomes more efficient over time; in legal ra-
tionality, with its multiple goals, rules of law tend toward optimal scope, 
neither over-inclusive nor under-inclusive. 
4
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Section IV.E concerns a problem in judicial decision making that is 
common to both economic rationality and legal rationality. Arrow's Im-
possibility Theorem is used to show that individual consistency is not 
sufficient to guarantee that collective decisions by a panel of judges, who 
decide cases by majority rule, will also be consistent because of the "ag-
gregation" problem. 
The second question answered by this article is: what is the rela-
tionship between economic rationality and legal rationality in judicial 
decisions? In Section V, economic rationality and legal rationality are 
shown to have two usual relationships in judicial decisions. When judges 
use economic rationality they will adopt the goal of efficiency and bal-
ance competing interests through marginal trade-offs. Under these cir-
cumstances, economic rationality and legal rationality will be isomor-
phic, or close to it, because economic concepts can be mapped onto 
relevant legal concepts and judges will tend to interpret legal concepts to 
preserve the properties and results in both disciplines. However, if 
judges employ legal rationality as the dominant rationality, legal rational-
ity and economic rationality will rarely be isomorphic or consistent, be-
cause legal concepts based upon goals that are often inconsistent with ef-
ficiency cannot be mapped into economic concepts. 
The third question this article answers is: when thinking like an 
economist and thinking like a lawyer conflict, should economics trump 
law? The conflict between economic rationality and legal rationality is 
most pronounced in disputes involving fundamental rights (e.g., Fourth 
Amendment rights). One side employs economic rationality (balancing 
interests, e.g., civil rights vs. security) and the other side employs legal 
rationality (recognizes that a past case mandating a high level of civil 
rights protection, is a binding precedent that includes another case). In 
such disputes, the opposing parties might as well be talking different lan-
guages for which there is no translation. Section V.C concerns two such 
disputes. One involves the exclusionary rule for evidence seized in vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment.9 The other questions whether national 
security measures advocated by Judge Posner in response to the terrorist 
attacks, of September 11, 2001, violate the U.S. Constitution.lO The arti-
cle concludes that when economic rationality and legal rationality con-
flict, no a priori ll reason exists why economic rationality should trump 
legal rationality. Such conflicts have to be resolved by asking which ab-
9 U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
IO POSNER, supra note 7 at 64, 80, 86, 87, 95, 103, 108-10. 
II "A priori" means knowledge based upon logical reasoning alone without any reference to 
knowledge based upon experience. 
5
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stract logical model, economics or law, more accurately reflects experi-
ence in the real world. The answer is a matter of judgment over which 
reasonable persons can and do differ. 
I. THE THREE ELEMENTS OF A RATIONAL DECISION PROCESS 
Economic optimization and legal adjudication have in common the 
three elements of a rational decision process: consistency, purposeful-
ness, and constraint. As philosopher Robert Nozick wrote, "rationality is 
a matter of reliability.,,12 The reliability element of rationality accounts 
for the emphasis that both economists and lawyers place on consistency 
in their explanations of economic and legal decision-making. 13 
In addition to consistency, both economic optimization and legal ad-
judication require purposefulness. Nozick also said that rationality is a 
goal-directed or instrumental process. 14 The textbook definition of eco-
nomics, the allocation of scarce resources among competing ends, in-
cludes the goal-directed element because individuals who allocate re-
sources are assumed to maximize satisfaction, utility, or profits. 
Purposefulness and consistency are related because consistency criteria 
restrict the permissible means that can be used to achieve the desired 
ends. 15 
Similarly, legal adjudication is purposeful because judges and law-
yers are constantly refining and clarifying the goals and issues that are to 
be decided in cases. One cannot determine which facts of a case are ma-
terial unless one knows the purpose for which the facts are probative. 
For example, in a negligence case, if the goal is deterrence of careless 
behavior, one set of facts is material; however, if the goal is risk distribu-
tion or enterprise liability, another set of facts, determining who is the 
cheapest insurer, is material. I6 First-year law students are taught to begin 
briefs for mock appellate court competitions with a question that frames 
the issue in a way that will focus the court on facts most favorable to 
their side of the case. In other words, an appellate brief poses a question 
12 ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 64 (1993). 
13 JOSEPH STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS 28-29 (1997); Frank Esterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the 
Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802, 812 (1982). 
14 NOZICK, note 12 at 64. 
15 Legal reasoning and economic reasoning have different restrictions on the moves that are 
allowed. Legitimate moves in economics involve the symbols> or =, whereas the legitimate moves 
in law involve the symbol ::::>. See STEVEN BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING xv 
(1985) ("The strong claim that legal reasoning is not different from reasoning in other fields is mis-
leading in a significant respect. The characteristics of a field's data and language, as well as the laws 
ofiogic, determine the transformations, or 'moves,' that can or cannot be made within a field."). 
16 See O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 305-06 (N.J. 1983). 
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to suggest the purpose of the decision, making some facts material and 
other facts immaterial. 
With respect to the third element, constraint, a rational decision 
process must take into consideration the constraints that hinder a rational 
actor from achieving her or his goals. In economic rationality, various 
scarcities in the form of budget, cost, and other constraints stand in the 
way of one's purpose. The principal institutional constraint on judicial 
decisions is precedent, which mandates that judges must decide like 
cases alike. 
II. THE MODEL OF ECONOMIC RATIONALITY 
This section presents the standard model of economic rationality 
that is found in many intermediate microeconomic textbooks.'7 Section 
IV a presents a new model of legal rationality that parallels and can be 
compared to the model of legal rationality. 
A. THE ECONOMIC AxIOMS 
Two accepted principles define economic rationality, or what it 
means to "think like an economist." The first is that more of a good is 
preferred to less, and the second is that for any two bundles of goods, an 
individual can determine whether he or she prefers one bundle to the 
other or is indifferent. These principles can be translated into binary re-
lations. Two properties of these relations, transitivity and complete-
ness,I8 are essential to understanding what thinking like an economist 
means. The two principles also provide the logical foundation for the 
balancing of competing interests through marginal trade-offs, which is 
used in the theory of optimal choice and cost-benefit analysis. 
The first principle, that individuals maximize their goals,can be 
stated as Axiom E I: More of a good is preferred to less. A "good" repre-
sents a product or a service; collections of goods are called "bundles." 
Although an individual can become sated with anyone good, the eco-
nomic choices individuals really care about concern choices they must 
make among competing goods in circumstances in which they have less 
17 HAL VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 34-36 (7th ed. 
2006). 
18 See HIRSCHFELDER & HIRSCHFELDER, supra note 4, at 90. The binary relation x >- y, 
which is defmed on real numbers, is reflexive, transitive, antisymmetric, and complete. A binary 
relation having these four properties is called a total order (linear order) relation. A total order rela-
tion is also suggestively called a linear order relation because its properties guarantee that it is possi-
ble to rank order all bundles, outputs, or even cases at law (when economic rationality is being used 
by judges). Id. 
7
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than they want of most goods. 19 
The symbolic representation for Axiom EI is the binary relation 
x >- y which reads "x is strictly preferred to y.,,20 This means that, if 
there are two bundles of goods, and the second bundle has at least as 
much of every good as the first bundle and more of one good, then the 
second bundle is strictly preferred.21 For example, if there are two bun-
dles, bundle x, which has one apple and one orange, and bundle y, which 
has one apple and two oranges, Axiom EI says that bundle y is strictly 
preferred to bundle x (y >- x) because it contains more goods. 
However, Axiom EI cannot be used to decide an economic prefer-
ence when one bundle has more of one good and the other bundle has 
more of the other good. For example, if bundle y has one apple and three 
oranges, and bundle z, has two apples and one orange, then bundle y has 
more oranges and bundle z has more apples and Axiom EI does not ap-
ply. It is here that the second economic principle becomes important, 
because it eliminates indeterminacy between bundle y and bundle z. 
The second principle can be stated as Axiom E2: For any two bun-
dles of goods, an individual can determine whether he or she prefers one 
bundle to the other or is indifferent. Each of an individual's preferences 
under Axiom E2 can be symbolically represented by one of three binary 
relations. For any two bundles of goods, x and y, one of the binary rela-
tions must be true. First, x >- y, which reads either "x is weakly preferred 
to y" or "x is as least as good as y"; second, the converse y >- x; or third, 
x = y, which reads either "x is equal to y" or "an individual is indifferent 
between x and y." 
Axiom E2 says for any two bundles, an economically rational indi-
vidual must be able to say whether he or she weakly prefers one bundle 
to the other or is indifferent. Not everyone will have the same prefer-
ences. Those who prefer oranges to apples may prefer bundle y (one ap-
ple and three oranges) to bundle z (two apples and one orange), and the 
binary relation y >- z will be true. Those who prefer apples to oranges 
may prefer bundle z to bundle y, and the binary relation z >- y will be 
true. 
Or, a person may be indifferent between the bundles, and y = z will 
be true. But, due to the completeness property of economic rationality, 
one of the three binary relations that express an individuals preferences 
under Axiom E2 must be true for any two bundles. The completeness 
property is important because it justifies one of economic rationality's 
19 VARIAN, supra note 17 at 44. 
20 The binary relations x >- Y is defined on real numbers. 
21 Axiom E 1 states that preferences are monotonic. 
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fundamental principles, "opportunity COSt.,,22 
The binary relations which express Axioms E 1 and E2 also have the 
transitivity property. Transitivity is defined as a relationship between any 
three bundles such that if bundle x is preferred to bundle y, and bundle y 
is preferred to bundle z, then bundle x must be preferred to bundle z (If 
x ~ y and y ~ z, then x ~ z). Transitivity is the consistency criterion of 
economic rationality. For example, if an economically rational person 
prefers apples to oranges and prefers oranges to pineapples, then that 
person must prefer apples to pineapples; the person's preference for ap-
ples is transitive to pineapples. If a person's preferences are "intransi-
tive" such that he or she prefers apples to oranges and prefers oranges to 
pineapples, but prefers pineapples to apples, that person has inconsistent 
preferences in terms of economic rationality. In other words, such a per-
son is economically irrational. Transitivity gives a rigid structure to eco-
nomic rationality; it is the backbone of economic reasoning. 
In addition to its inherent properties of transitivity and complete-
ness, Axiom E2 also provides economic rationality with the logical 
foundation for balancing competing interests via marginal trade-offs, 
which is used in the theory of efficient (or optimal) choice and cost-
benefit analysis. 
B. THE THEORY OF OPTIMAL (CONSTRAINED) CHOICE 
Assume that apples and oranges represent competing interests. Con-
sider two bundles: bundle x, which has 3 apples and 3 oranges, and bun-
dle y, which has 4 apples and 2 oranges. If an individual is indifferent (x 
= y), both bundles give this particular consumer the same level of satis-
faction or utility. He or she is willing to trade one apple for one orange 
(1-1 ). 
Now consider bundle y (above) and a third bundle, bundle z, which 
has 6 apples and 1 orange. If this individual is indifferent (y = z), both 
bundles give this particular consumer the same level of satisfaction. He 
or she must now get two apples in order to be willing to give up one or-
ange (2-1). 
By transitivity, if x = y, and y = z, then x = z. Notice that the mar-
ginal trade-off of apples for oranges that maintains indifference between 
x = y is (1-1), but that the marginal trade-off of apples for oranges that 
maintains indifference between y = Z has increased to (2-1). This makes 
22 A decision to use resources in some way results in the loss of an opportunity to use them in 
another way. That loss is called "opportunity cost." For example, the opportunity cost of fighting a 
war is the forgoing of additional civilian spending. The cost of a decision to use resources in some 
way is the next best alternative use for those resources. 
9
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sense because as an individual has more of one good, apples, and less of 
another good, oranges, the good that the individual has less of becomes 
more valued relative to the more plentiful good, so that indifference can 
only be maintained if more and more of the good that is becoming more 
plentiful is added for each unit of relatively scarce good that is taken 
away. This is called the law of increasing marginal rate of substitution in 
consumption. 
Given that this individual is indifferent among bundles x, y, and z, 
which bundle should he or she buy? The efficient or optimal choice de-
pends upon the prices of apples and oranges and the individual's income. 
Economists say that an individual's choices are constrained by income. 
If the amount he or she has to spend on apples and oranges is limited and 
the price of oranges is very high relative to the price of apples due to ex-
treme weather damage to the orange crop, bundle z, which has the fewest 
oranges, is the efficient choice in the sense that it is the cheapest of the 
three bundles that give the same satisfaction; if the price of apples were 
high relative to the price of oranges, bundle x would be the efficient 
choice among the three bundles. Thus, the optimal choice involves the 
relationship between the marginal trade-off of apples and oranges ac-
cording to one's preferences (the benefits) and the marginal trade-off of 
apples and oranges according to market prices (the costs). 
Thinking like an economist means employing the economic axioms 
and the theory of optimal (constrained) choice rigorously (respecting 
transitivity) to any and every possible pair of the infinitely variable 
choices (completeness). In other words, most individuals want more 
goods than they can afford; their wants are constrained by their income. 
This means that they must choose among myriad competing goods. An 
economically rational person functions like a computer and makes 
choices by weighing the costs and benefits of potential marginal changes 
in consumption of each good against every other good they purchase or 
could purchase. Moreover, according to the theory of optimal choice, the 
nearly infinite number of calculations that are required to make are com-
pletely consistent with each other; that is they respect transitivity. 
III. THE TUSSMAN & TENBROEK MODEL OF EQUAL PROTECTION 
The Equal Protection of the Laws by Tussman & tenBroek, which 
describes constitutional equal-protection categories and relations with 
Venn diagrams, is a well-known and generally accepted example of the 
formal approach to legal rationality.23 Understanding the Tussman & 
23 Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. 
10
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tenBroek model advances this article in two ways. First, it demonstrates 
a precedent for the abstract formal description of legal rationality in 
terms of logical relations; Tussman & tenBroek employed this formal 
approach to judicial reasoning. Second, the Tussman & tenBroek model 
makes the more general model of legal rationality easier to understand. 
Tussman & tenBroek begin by distinguishing between "general" 
legislation, which applies without qualification to all persons, and "spe-
cial" legislation, which applies to a limited class of persons. When legis-
lation concerns general matters of economic or social welfare, the law 
need only rationally relate to a legitimate governmental purpose. How-
ever, when legislation classifies persons for differing benefits or burdens, 
it must comply with the Fourteenth Amendment, which commands that 
no person shall be denied equal protection of the laws. 
Constitutional jurisprudence has changed a great deal since Justice 
Holmes said in Buck v. Bell that a claim based upon equal protection of 
the laws "is the usual last resort of constitutional arguments. ,,24 When, 
subsequent to Buck, the United States Supreme Court eschewed substan-
tive due process25 as the test by which to evaluate the constitutionality of 
statutes,26 the Court had to find some other means for evaluating legisla-
tive enactments. Equal-protection analysis was a natural choice, because 
the construction of legal classifications and relations based upon the rec-
ognition of similarities and differences is the essence oflegal rationality. 
Equal-protection arguments are paradigmatic examples of legal rational-
ity. They rely on the ability of judges to recognize similarities and dif-
ferences in the classification of individuals for treatment by statutes.27 
Equal protection guarantees that similarly situated people will be 
dealt with in a similar manner by government and that people of different 
REV. 341 (1949). Exposition of the Tussman & tenBroek model follows JOHN NOWAK & RONALD 
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Ch. 14, at 569-73 (4th ed. 1991). 
24 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). 
25 Substantive due process differs from the more familiar procedural due process, which re-
fers to whether persons have been given fair notice and the opportunity to be heard before the gov-
ernment takes an action that will affect their interests. With the rise of natural rights philosophy, 
some jurists suggested that the concept of due process should also have substantive content. By this 
they meant that if a legislature passed any law that restricted vested rights or violated natural law, it 
restricted the freedom of some individuals in violation of the U.S. Constitution. Ultimately, the con-
cept of substantive due process fell into disrepute because it was believed that appointed judges 
should not substitute their views for the will of the people as expressed by their democratically 
elected representatives. 
26 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 
23, §§ 11.3-11.4 (4th ed. 1991). 
27 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 23, at 568-907 (a popular constitutional law textbook 
attesting to the importance of equal protection in contemporary constitutional jurisprudence by the 
space allotted to it: it devotes over three hundred pages to equal protection). 
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circumstances will not be treated as if they were the same. The equal-
protection principle does not prohibit government from classifying per-
sons or drawing lines in the creation or application of laws in order to 
advance society's legitimate interests; it guarantees that those classifica-
tions will not be based upon impermissible discriminatory criteria or 
used arbitrarily to burden a group of individuals. In reviewing any clas-
sification, a court must determine whether persons classified by law for 
similar treatment are "similarly situated" and whether persons classified 
by law for different treatment are "dissimilar.,,28 This question relates to 
the bases upon which the government can distinguish between individu-
als in society. 
Courts interpreting the crucial phrase "similarly situated" must 
avoid two errors. First, courts must avoid defining "similarly situated" 
as merely belonging to a particular class, when, as shown below, "simi-
larly situated" refers to a relationship between classes. To define a class 
is simply to designate a quality, characteristic, trait or relation that any 
individual in the class must possess. "Similarly situated" cannot mean 
simply similar in the possession of the classifying trait; otherwise, any 
classification would be reasonable by this test, since all members of any 
class are similarly situated in this respect. For example, a law that im-
poses burdens on all those who are "red-haired makers of margarine" 
would be legitimate in the trivial sense in which the law applies equally 
to all who have the classifying traits. 
Second, courts must avoid the notion that a classification including 
individuals who themselves belong to different "natural" classes is 
somehow artificial and therefore illegitimate. Similarly situated indi-
viduals can be different in some absolute sense such as gender. Al-
though men and women are different, the promotion of legitimate gov-
ernmental ends can rarely be based upon that difference; an individual's 
sex cannot be used to determine whether that individual may be allowed 
to practice law, is allowed to be an executor of an estate,29 or is old 
enough to drink alcoholic beverages.3o Thus, the equal-protection "issue 
is not whether, in defining a class, the legislature has carved the universe 
at a natural joint.,,31 In other words, a classification cannot be deemed 
unreasonable by asking whether the classification either corresponds to 
some "natural" grouping or separates those who naturally belong to-
gether. 
28 Whether an individual properly falls within a specific classification concerns procedural 
due process. 
29 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
30 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
31 Tussman & tenBroek, note 23 at 346. 
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In order to detennine whether a law that classifies different groups 
for different benefits or burdens is legitimate, that is, is based upon con-
stitutionally pennissible criteria, a court must look to the purpose of the 
legislation. The purpose of a law is legitimate if it either eliminates a 
public mischief or achieves some positive public good. This focus on the 
purpose of legislation is consistent with the notion that a rational process 
is purposeful. 
Once a court has detennined that the governmental purpose is le-
gitimate, the court must analyze how the government has actually classi-
fied persons to achieve that purpose. Such an analysis involves deter-
mining the relation between the legitimate purpose and the actual 
classification. For example, in time of war, Congress can legitimately 
pass a law to meet the dangers of sabotage. But when the actual legisla-
tion identifies saboteurs by ethnic ancestry, as in Hirabayashi v. United 
States,32 a court must analyze whether the classification violates equal 
protection. 
Tussman & tenBroek use Venn diagrams to illustrate the five possi-
ble relations between a general classification created by a legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose (e.g., saboteurs) and the law's actual classification of 
individuals (e.g., those of a certain ethnic ancestry). These relations are 
reproduced as Figure 1. Let L stand for a classification based on a le-
gitimate governmental purpose, and A stand for the actual government 






: All L's are A's and all A's are L's 
: No L's are A's 
: All A's are L's but some L's are not A's 
: All L's are A's but some A's are not L's 
: Some L's are A'sj some L's are not A'sj 
and some A's are not L's 
Figure 1 
The reasonableness of any actual government classification, A, de-
fined in law depends entirely upon its relation to the general classifica-
tion based on a legitimate governmental purpose, L. The first two rela-
32 See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
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tions represent the ideal limits of reasonableness and unreasonableness, 
respectively. In the first relationship (1) the law is perfectly reasonable: 
the general classification based on a legitimate governmental purpose in-
cludes every member of the actual class defined in the law. The con-
verse is also true. In the second relationship (2) the law is perfectly un-
reasonable: the general classification based on a legitimate governmental 
purpose does not include any member of the actual class defined in the 
law. 
The third relationship (3) represents under-inclusiveness: the gen-
eral classification based on a legitimate governmental purpose includes 
everyone in the actual class defined in law, but the actual class excludes 
some people who belong to the general classification. In other words, 
the law overlooks some individuals who are included in the legitimate 
government purpose. Although this relationship is not perfectly reason-
able, the Supreme Court has upheld under-inclusive legislation to allow 
the legislature to attack a general problem in a piecemeal fashion. Nar-
rowing the purpose of the law could avoid the charge of under-
inclusiveness; however, such an approach runs the risk of being found 
unconstitutional on grounds that the law employs suspect classifications 
such as race or ethnicity, forbidden traits, or involves unreasonable and 
arbitrary discrimination. 
The fourth relationship (4) represents over-inclusiveness: the actual 
class defined in law includes individuals who are outside the classifica-
tion based on a legitimate governmental purpose. Because over-
inclusive classifications reach the innocent bystander, the hapless victim 
of circumstance or association, the prima facie case against over-
inclusive classifications is stronger than the case against under-
inclusiveness. Everyone in an under-inclusive classification at least has 
the characteristic at which the law aims. Nonetheless, over-inclusive 
classifications have been sustained in emergency situations, such as war-
time.33 
The fifth relationship (5) represents a law that is both under-
inclusive and over-inclusive. For example, in Hirabayashi the World 
War II classification of "American citizens of Japanese ancestry" for the 
purpose of meeting the dangers of sabotage can be challenged both on 
grounds that it is under-inclusive, since American citizens of German or 
Italian ancestry were equally under the strain of divided loyalties, and is 
over-inclusive, since the government did not suppose that all American 
citizens of Japanese ancestry were disloyal. Sustaining this classification 
required the finding of sufficient emergency to justify imposing a burden 
33 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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upon a larger class than was believed to be within the legitimate purpose 
of the statute and to justify the failure to extend the law to a wider class 
of potential saboteurs. 
The Venn diagrams used by Tussman & tenBroek can be repre-
sented symbolically in terms of binary relations. Translating the Venn 
diagrams into binary relations is important, because it demonstrates the 
essential bridge between their model and the general model of legal ra-
tionality, which uses these binary relations and is presented below. The 
translation of the five Venn diagrams shows that the Tussman & ten-
Broek model is merely a specific example of the more general model of 
legal rationality. (1) Both L :::) A and A :::) L, where the binary relation 
L :::) A is read "L contains A". (2) L and A are disjoint, so the relation :::) 
is not defined. (3) L:::) A. (4) A :::) L. (5) L and A intersect, so the rela-
tion :::) is not defined. 
Tussman & tenBroek's diagrams can also depict the five possible 
relations between any two cases through the principle of precedent. Dia-
grams (1), (3), and (4) depict the three possible ways that two cases can 
be related to each other as binding precedents. In diagram (1), the two 
cases are like in all material respects; they are mutual precedents. In dia-
gram (3), case L is a binding precedent that includes case A. In diagram 
(4), case A is a binding precedent that includes case L. In Diagrams (2) 
and (5), the cases L and A are distinguishable; that is, unrelated by bind-
ing precedent.34 Thus, Tussman & tenBroek's specific model of equal 
protection applies a formal approach to judicial reasoning. The general 
theory of legal rationality is merely a generalization from their well-
known and accepted model. 
IV. THE MODEL OF LEGAL RATIONALITY 
A. THE LEGAL AxIOMS 
This section defines what it means to "think like a lawyer." Parallel-
ing economic rationality, legal rationality has two principles that define 
what this means. The first axiom specifies that judges maximize their 
goals. The second axiom states that for any two cases, judges can deter-
mine whether they are like or distinguishable. These will be defined 
34 In Diagram (5), if there are two or more cases that are completely included or contained in 
the intersection of A and L, A n L (which is read "the intersection of A and L"), they are alike with 
respect to A and L; therefore, the principle of precedent requires that they must be decided alike. 
That is, (A n L) :::J aU cases that should be decided alike with respect to the legal category or rule of 
law (A and L). See the discussion of Bush v. Gore in Section IV.C. 
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symbolically in tenns of binary relations that have two properties: transi-
tivity and incompleteness. As with economic rationality, a key criterion 
of legal rationality is consistency, which is the transitivity of a rule of 
law from one case to the next through precedent. However, unlike eco-
nomic rationality, legal rationality is incomplete because not all cases are 
related to each other by precedent. 
A "case" is a short story of an incident in which the state acted or 
may act to settle a particular dispute. Treating a case as a short story of 
an incident emphasizes that every case and its particular facts are unique. 
Since concrete facts are unique, particular facts in one case have no pre-
cedential value for particular facts in another case. In order to have pre-
cedential value, facts must be considered as representative instances of 
abstract categories. Karl Llewellyn said: "Each concrete fact of the case 
arranges itself, I say, as the representative of a much wider abstract cate-
gory of facts, and it is not in itself but as a member of the category that 
you attribute significance to it.,,35 For example, a Toyota automobile in 
one case has no precedential significance for a Mack truck in another 
case. However, if the court considers the Toyota as a particularized in-
stance of the abstract fact category, "vehicle," the case can be precedent 
for the case involving the Mack truck because the legal category of "ve-
hicle" contains the concrete facts of both cases. 
In addition to representing abstract fact categories, cases also stand 
for collections of legal categories that consist of generalized facts (such 
as "vehicle"), mixed abstract facts and law (such as negligence and due 
process), or abstract legal concepts (such as order and liberty). Lle-
wellyn said: "The court can decide the particular dispute only according 
to a general rule which covers a whole class of like disputes.,,36 Each 
case stands for a general rule that covers or contains a whole class of 
cases in addition to the one before the court. Take for example the rule 
of law in negligence, the elements of which are (1) that the defendant 
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, (2) that the defendant committed a 
breach of this duty, and (3) that this breach was the actual and proximate 
cause of (4) the legal injury experienced by the plaintiff. The plaintiffs 
lawyer has the burden of proving that the defendant and her or his ac-
tions are contained in each of the italicized legal categories in the four 
elements. The rule of negligence is a collection of legal categories. Both 
economic rationality and legal rationality are defined by fundamental ab-
stract categories and collections of those categories: economic "goods" 
are to "abstract legal categories" as economic "bundles" are to "cases" 
35 LLEWELLYN, supra note I at 48 (italics in original). 
36 [d. at 41. 
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and "rules of case law.,,37 
In addition, both economic rationality and legal rationality require 
purposeful activity. Economics assumes that self-interested individuals 
will maximize utility or satisfaction. Similarly judges-who are required 
to be impartial or disinterested, rather than self-interested-are assumed 
to maximize social utility or social welfare. Individual utility or satisfac-
tion, which is a subjective concept, can be given concrete by revealed 
preferences or choices that individuals make among bundles of compet-
ing goods or ends. Similarly, the goal of judges to maximize social util-
ity or social welfare, which is also a subjective concept, can be given 
concrete by their decisions that reveal judicial preferences among the 
sometimes competing goals of efficiency, equity, liberty, order, majority 
rule, and so on. 
As discussed above, Llewellyn said that courts can decide particular 
disputes only according to a general rule of law that covers a whole class 
of like disputes.38 The rule of law in a case may be stated on a contin-
uum from narrow to broad formulations depending upon the level of 
generality of the relevant legal categories. Legal categories or rules of 
law that are so narrow as to be limited to a single case (for example, ap-
plying only to a pale magenta Buick with a serial number 732507 instead 
of a "vehicle"i9 provide no future guidance to lawyers or society. 
Judges, other things being equal, can be assumed to prefer more-general 
rules oflaw to less-general rules oflaw. 
Two principles define legal rationality, or what it means to think 
like a lawyer. The first is that judges prefer more-general (inclusive) 
rules of law to narrow rules is Axiom L1; it can be stated symbolically as 
a binary relation: If case x :::J case y, then case x >- case y, which reads 
as, "if case x is a binding precedent that includes case y, then the rule in 
case x is preferred to the rule in case y.'.40 Just as economic rationality 
assumes that budget constraints prevent individuals from acquiring an 
unlimited amount of goods, one important constraint judges confront that 
limits the scope of legal categories despite their preference for inclusive-
ness is stare decisis, which is discussed below. 
The second principle, that for any two cases, a judge can determine 
whether the cases are like in all relevant (material) legal categories or are 
37 In mathematics, fundamental categories are called "elements" and collections of categories 
are called "sets." 
38 LLEWELLYN, supra note I, at 41. 
39 !d. at 48. 
40 Although symbols for Axiom Ll and Axiom L2 do not appear to go together because they 
use different symbols, all that Axiom Ll says is that maximizing judges can rank order legal catego-
ries that are inclusive. 
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distinguishable, is Axiom L2. The symbolic representation for Axiom 
L2 is the binary relation case x ::> case y case x .. For any two cases x and 
y, if case x ::> case y (which is read, "case x is a precedent that includes 
case y"), case y ::> case x, or both, then the cases are like; if the binary 
relation::> is not defined over case x and case y, then they are distin-
guishable. 
Axiom L2 says that the only way that the binary relation::> can be 
satisfied is if case x is a binding precedent on case y, case y is a binding 
precedent on case x, or both. Any two cases for which the binary relation 
::> is not defined are distinguishable, that is, unrelated by binding prece-
dent. 
The binary relation x ::> y has four mathematical properties.41 Two 
of these properties, incompleteness and transitivity, are important. The 
incompleteness property means that not every two cases are related to 
each other by legal precedent. The incompleteness property figures 
prominently below in the discussion of whether the principle of prece-
dent is a strong or weak constraint on judicial decisions. 
The transitivity property is important because it provides the consis-
tency criterion of legal rationality. It says that whenever case x ::> case y 
and case y ::> case z, then case x ::> case z. In order to show how the tran-
sitivity property functions as legal rationality's consistency criterion in 
the real world, actual judicial decisions must be discussed. 
Edward Levi's discussion of nineteenth-century product-liability 
cases contains a classic description of the legal rationality's transitivity 
property.42 In those nineteenth-century cases, courts were primarily con-
cerned with the question whether a seller ought to incur legal liability for 
a product that caused injury to a person who was not the buyer of the 
product, that is, when there was no contractual relationship, or "privity," 
between the injured party and the seller. Nineteenth-century product-
liability cases chronicle the gradual erosion of the legal rule that privity 
of contract between the seller and the injured party was a legal prerequi-
site for a lawsuit. 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, courts searched for a 
rule of law that would justify an expansion of product liability beyond 
privity and yet limit liability within manageable bounds. A categorical 
distinction began to crystallize between products that are imminently 
dangerous and products that are not imminently dangerous. Persons in-
41 The binary relation x => y, which is defined on sets, is reflexive, transitive, antisymmetric, 
and incomplete. A binary relation having these four properties is called a Partial Order Relation. 
HIRSCHFELDER & HIRSCH FELDER, supra note 4, at 89. 
42 LEVI, supra note I, at 8-27. 
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jured by imminently dangerous products had standing to sue sellers 
without privity of contract, whereas persons injured by products not im-
minently dangerous had no standing to sue sellers without privity of con-
tract. The second half of the nineteenth century saw the gradual expan-
sion of the "imminently dangerous" category. Three of those cases will 
be used as illustrations of the transitivity property of Axiom L2. 
In each case, the court included the product in the "imminently dan-
gerous" category, implicitly expanding the category. For example, in 
Thomas v. Winchester (1852),43 a woman was seriously injured after she 
took poison mislabeled as medicine by a druggist and sold to her hus-
band. The court upheld the verdict for the plaintiff. In order to prevent 
"an infinity of actions," the court could have narrowly limited the legal 
category of the imminently dangerous articles to those articles whose 
function is to destroy, like poison and guns. In Devlin v. Smith (1882),44 
a man was killed when a scaffold on which he was working collapsed. 
The court ruled for the plaintiff. In order to broaden the definition of 
imminently dangerous articles to include a scaffold but still not have 
open-ended liability for all articles, the court could have defined the legal 
category of imminently dangerous articles to include those that are dan-
gerous in ordinary use. In Statler v. George A. Ray Manufacturing Co. 
(1909),45 a man was killed when a coffee urn in a restaurant exploded. 
Again, the court ruled for the plaintiff. In order to include a coffee urn in 
the legal category of imminently dangerous articles, the court could have 
further expanded the legal definition to include articles capable of being 
dangerous. 
In implicitly expanding a legal category, the courts may not even 
have been aware that they were changing the law. It took a Judge Car-
dozo to see what was really happening.46 However, if they had been 
conscious that they were changing the law, they would have said they 
were changing the definition of "imminently dangerous" in a manner 
similar to that stated above. These cases exemplify the transitivity prop-
erty of legal rationality. 
43 Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (I 852}. 
44 Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (I 882}. 
45 Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 88 N.E. 1063 (N.Y. 1909). 
46 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., III N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
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Statlerv. Ray ----~Io""""'-...... 
Devlin v. Smith ----I-'" 
Thomas v. Winchester.....; .... ~ ..... ~ 
Figure 2 
In tenns of the transitivity property of legal rationality, Statler is a 
precedent that covers Devlin, and Devlin is a precedent that covers Tho-
mas, therefore Statler must cover Thomas (Statler ~ Devlin ~ Thomas); 
however, the reverse order is not transitive. If Thomas was the control-
ling precedent when Slater was decided, Slater would have to be decided 
contrary to Thomas because Slater is not included in Thomas. In other 
words, the transitivity principle in law works like a set of Russian nesting 
dolls.47 The Venn diagram in Figure 2 depicts the transitivity property of 
legal rationality. 
B. STARE DECISIS CONSTRAINS OVER-INCLUSIVE RULES 
A court may state a rule of law either narrowly or broadly; subse-
quent courts may further narrow or broaden the rule. In the result-
oriented approach to precedents, a later court can always reexamine a 
case and invoke the canon that no judge has the power to decide what is 
not before her or him. Ajudge's categorization of the facts does not bind 
judges in subsequent cases; a judge's view of the facts is mere dictum.48 
The later court can recategorize the facts or alter legal categories to 
broaden or narrow the picture of what was actually before the earlier 
court, and the later court can hold that the legal categories in the prior 
case should be understood as thus expanded or restricted.49 A judge in a 
47 A set of Russian nesting dolls (matryoshka) consists of several identical dolls, each suc-
cessively smaller than the last. The smallest doll fits inside the next larger doll, which in tum fits 
inside the next larger doll, and so on until all the dolls are nested inside the largest doll. The smaller 
dolls can fit inside the largest doll. However, the converse is not true; a larger doll cannot fit into a 
smaller doll. 
48 Abbreviated form of obiter dictum, "a remark by the way," that is, an observation or re-
mark made by a judge in an opinion that is not essential to the court's determination and is not le-
gally binding. 
49 MELVIN EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 52 (1988); HARRY JONES, JOHN 
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present case may also find irrelevant the existence or absence of facts 
that prior judges thought important. This is an elastic approach to prece-
dents. However, the idea that precedents are malleable does not alter the 
conclusion that the principle of precedents constrains a judge's freedom 
to determine the level of generality of legal categories or rules of case 
law. 
Consider the effect of precedent on a judge's decision in a new case 
when he or she believes existing precedents are over-inclusive. An over-
inclusive rule of law includes cases that a court would prefer to distin-
guish but cannot due to the principle of stare decisis. Judges often real-
ize that a rule of law is over-inclusive when they must decide a new case, 
say case x, that falls within the rule of law as currently formulated in 
case y, but that they believe should be decided differently from case y. In 
order to provide a rationale for the decision based upon a general rule of 
law, a judge must reformulate the rule of law in case y more narrowly to 
exclude case x from case y. Thus, in order to retain the freedom to dis-
tinguish cases, courts are constrained from adopting over-inclusive rules 
oflaw. 
Conversely, Levi's discussion of nineteenth-century "imminently 
dangerous" product-liability cases is an example of how judges lose 
freedom to distinguish future cases when a rule of law is over-inclusive. 
In these cases, judges expanded precedents by arguing exclusively from 
language found in past opinions wholly without reference to the facts of 
the case that called the language forth. This way of using the authority 
of precedents is called the literal view.50 Through the use of the literal 
view, the concept of imminently dangerous products remained roughly 
the same, but its contents expanded. 
When Statler v. Ray, the coffee-urn case, expanded the meaning of 
"imminently dangerous" from articles dangerous in ordinary use to arti-
cles capable of being dangerous, it opened the door to the expansion that 
swallowed up the "imminently dangerous" rule. The fear that expanding 
rules of law will so broaden legal categories that future cases cannot be 
distinguished constrains judges from expanding a rule too far, as hap-
pened in the nineteenth-century product-liability cases, thereby opening 
the "flood gates" to lawsuits and resulting in an infinity of actions. 
Only seven years after Statler, in the famous case MacPherson v. 
Buick Motor CO.,5l Judge Cardozo overruled the half-century-old dis-
tinction between products that are imminently dangerous and those that 
KERNOCHAN, & ARTHUR MURPHY, LEGAL METHOD: CASES AND TEXT MATERIALS 117 (1980). 
50 LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 72-74. 
51 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., III N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
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are not, making it possible for any person injured by a new product to 
sue the manufacturer in negligence regardless of privity. Judge Cardozo 
may have thought that this particular distinction had outlived its utility so 
that courts no longer needed to retain the freedom to distinguish future 
cases. In general, to the extent that courts wish to retain the freedom to 
distinguish future cases, they are constrained by stare decisis from em-
ploying over-inclusive rules oflaw. 
C. NESTED RULES OF LAW CONSTRAIN UNDER-INCLUSIVE RULES 
Are the many rules of law in cases disparate and isolated, or are 
they bound together by fundamental principles such as due process and 
equity into a coherent whole? The answer to this question determines 
whether the principle of precedent is a weak or a strong constraint on un-
der-inclusive decisions by judges. Judges often realize that a rule of law 
is under-inclusive when they must decide a new case, say case x, that 
does not fall within the rule of law as currently formulated in case y, but 
that they believe should be decided consistently with case y. In order to 
provide a rationale for the decision based upon a general rule of law, a 
judge must reformulate the rule of law in case y more broadly to include 
both case x and case y. 
Ronald Dworkin defines a legal system bound together by funda-
mental principles as having the virtue of "integrity," which is superior to 
mere consistency: 
The plainest examples [of integrity] come from adjudication, and I 
choose one that illustrates only a partial victory for integrity so far. 
For some time British judges declared that although members of other 
professions were liable for damage caused by their carelessness, bar-
risters were immune from liability. Consistency, narrowly understood, 
would have required continuing that exception, but integrity condemns 
the special treatment of barristers unless it can be justified in principle, 
which seems unlikely. The House of Lords has now curtailed the ex-
emption: to that extent it has preferred integrity to narrow consis-
tency.52 Integri7 will not be satisfied, however, until the exemption is 
entirely erased.5 
Having one rule for negligent barristers and a different rule for other 
professionals who are negligent exemplifies disparate, isolated, under-
inclusive legal rules. However, if narrow local rules appear to be nested 
52 Saif Ali v. Sydney Mitchell & Co. (1978) 3 W.L.R. 849 (Eng.) (footnote renumbered). 
53 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 219-20 (1986). 
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within broader, inclusive legal rules, the broadest of which have the 
status of fundamental principles and standards, legal rationality begins to 
look more like a coherent whole. The process Dworkin describes may 
reflect what Lord Mansfield had in mind when he spoke of "the law 
working itself pure.,,54 Dworkin conceives of these two rules of law as 
being nested in a broader legal category, which he calls integrity, but 
which could be called horizontal equity55 or due process. 
Having different negligence rules and standards for barristers than 
for other professionals illustrates judicial attempts to treat law as consist-
ing of isolated, narrow under-inclusive rules, rather than being nested in 
broader fundamental principles. These attempts suggest arbitrariness, 
pandering to special interests, or politicized decisions, and they raise the 
specter of illegitimacy. Illegitimate does not mean illegal or unconstitu-
tional; one of the meanings the dictionary gives for "illegitimate" is "in-
correctly deduced.,,56 
Under-inclusive rules of law, that is, isolating a case within a nar-
row discrete rule of law to avoid explaining why the case is not like other 
cases that are nested within the same fundamental principles, weakens 
the principle of precedent, which is the law's principal constraint on arbi-
trary decisions. The minimalist approach, if taken to an extreme, treats 
each case as unique and isolated within its own local rule of case law. 
Such an approach, which can "distinguish a case to death" by expressly 
"confining the case to its particular facts," completely eviscerates the 
principle of precedent, that like cases should be decided alike, and ren-
ders judicial decisions illegitimate arbitrary exercises of power. 
Consider the following example of an under-inclusive rule of law 
that is disparate and isolated, as opposed to being nested within funda-
mental principles that make law a coherent whole. In Griswold v. Con-
necticut,57 the Supreme Court struck down a law prohibiting the use of 
contraceptives by married persons on the ground that it infringed a fun-
damental right to privacy. However, in Bowers v. Hardwick58 the Court 
upheld a Georgia state sodomy statute that made consensual homosexual 
activity between adults in private a crime, on the ground that sexual ac-
tivity is not a fundamental right. This case seemed to conflict with Gris-
wold. It is hard to conceive of a rule of law that can distinguish the right 
54 Lon Fuller, Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 377 (1978). 
55 Horizontal equity is the judicial analogue of equal protection of the laws that applies to 
legislative enactments. 
56 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (1976). 
57 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
58 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003). 
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to privacy of married couples from the right to privacy of homosexual 
couples without being based upon suspect, unreasonable, and under-
inclusive classifications. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Law-
rence v. Texas,59 overruled Bowers. The Supreme Court of Georgia 
also held that the statute, as applied, violated the fundamental right of 
privacy under the state constitution;60 
In the controversial case Bush v. Gore,61 which decided the 2000 
presidential election, the 5-4 majority overtly rejected the principle of 
precedent. The legitimacy of the decision has been seriously ques-
tioned.62 The Supreme Court's five conservative Justices intervened in 
Florida's electoral process twice and held that a planned manual recount 
violated the right to equal protection even though in many past cases in-
volving manual recounts they had not raised the equal-protection issue.63 
The majority said that the equal-protection right was unique to this case 
and that it would not be bound in future cases by any principles stated in 
Bush.64 
If the Court had decided not to intervene in Bush, that decision 
would have been consistent with its "New Federalism" precedents, which 
is the term for the conservative majority's views on state sovereignty 
versus national power.65 Within the ambit of this concept, state sover-
eignty usually trumps attempted national intervention either by federal 
statutes or by federal courts exercising equal-protection jurisdiction. The 
Venn diagram of Figure 3a depicts the relations among Bush (B), the 
New Federalism, and equal protection without intervention by the Court. 
Figure 3b depicts how the actual decision in Bush would affect the bal-
ance between New Federalism and equal protection assuming that cases 
in which federalism was an issue were decided consistently with Bush. 
If Bush were a legitimate decision, much of the consistency would 
require a sharp curtailment of New Federalism jurisprudence because it 
is would require a greatly reduced area devoted solely to the New Feder-
alism, as depicted by the change from Figure 3a to Figure 3b. In other 
S9 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
60 Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998). 
61 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
62 See, e.g., David Cole, Symposium: Assessing the Rehnquist Court's Parting Words on 
Criminal Justice: The Liberal Legacy of Bush v. Gore, 94 GEO. L.J. 1427, 1427-31 (2006). 
63 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 103 ("[T]he use of standard less manual recounts violates the 
Equal Protection Clause."). 
64 See id. at 109 ("Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem 
of equal protection generally presents many complexities."); David Cole, Symposium: Assessing the 
Rehnquist Court's Parting Words on Criminal Justice: The Liberal Legacy of Bush v. Gore, 94 GEO. 
L.J. 1427, 1429 (2006). 
6S Mark Killenbeck, The New Federalism in Perspective, 57 ARK. L. REv. I (2004). 
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words, Bush makes the New Federalism an over-inclusive category. 
Correspondingly, consistency would require greater intervention by the 
Court in state matters on grounds of equal protection, as depicted by the 
increase in size of the intersection of the New Federalism and equal pro-
tection from Figure 3a to Figure 3b.66 In other words, Bush makes the 
intersection of the New Federalism and equal protection an under-
inclusive category. 
New Equal New Equal 
Fe c1eralism Prote ction Fe c1eralism Prote ction 
® 
Figure 3a Figure 3b 
The principle of precedent in strong form mandates that courts 
consider whether a case is like or distinguishable from every other case 
within every local rule within which the case is nested, even if these 
broader rules intersect rather than nest themselves. Before promulgating 
a rule of law in a case, an appellate court should look for conflicts be-
tween the proposed rule of law and the rules of law of all cases in all 10-
cal rules that encompass the case (with the aid of a Westlaw or LEXIS 
search). If the court finds inconsistencies, then either the proposed rule 
of law is over- or under-inclusive or one of the conflicting cases has been 
decided incorrectly. 
D. THE CASE-SELECTION HYPOTHESIS AND OPTIMAL RULES 
Economics and law each have a theory that concludes that com-
mon-law adjudication tends toward optimal rules of case law (as defined 
below). Both theories posit the case-selection hypothesis, which states 
that common-law cases involving rules of law that are less than ideal are 
more likely to be "selected" for litigation. The theories conclude that 
common-law adjudication is a rational process that consistently pro-
gresses toward a goal. In economic rationality the goal is efficiency. In 
66 The intersection of the New Federalism and equal protection is described by the relation 
(New Federalism n Equal Protection). This relationship, which is defined as an intersection, was 
discussed supra in note 41 with respect to Venn Diagram (5) of the Tussman & tenBroek model. In 
Diagram (5) the intersection oflegal categories A and L was described as A n L. 
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legal rationality the goal is to optimize a rule to be neither over-inclusive 
nor under-inclusive. 
Law and economics scholars have constructed the theory that 
judge-made law tends toward economic efficiency over time even if 
judges do not consciously strive for this goa1.67 The theory concludes 
that judge-made law becomes more efficient through the process of se-
lective litigation. This theory has two key assumptions: first, inefficient 
rules of case law or statutes are more likely to be "selected" for challenge 
than efficient laws. The theory strongly presumes that efficient laws 
generate more economic benefits (in terms of Gross Domestic Product) 
than inefficient laws. If the allocation of a legal entitlement is ineffi-
cient, those who would benefit from a change to an efficient law will 
have more to gain than those who benefit from the inefficient law.68 
Thus, the former will file more lawsuits to change the inefficient law and 
spend more on such suits than those who benefit from the inefficient 
status quo. Conversely, if the allocation of a legal entitlement is effi-
cient, those who would benefit from a change to an inefficient law will 
have less to gain than those who benefit from an efficient law. Thus, the 
former will file fewer lawsuits to change an efficient law and spend less 
on such suits than those who benefit from defending the efficient status 
quo. In sum, people will spend more on litigation to overturn inefficient 
laws than to overturn efficient laws. 
The second assumption of the theory is that judges are not hostile 
to efficiency. At worst they may be indifferent to whether the outcome 
of a decision is efficient. It follows as a conclusion from the two as-
sumptions that even if judges decide cases randomly, say by flipping a 
coin, judge-made law will become more efficient as long as inefficient 
laws are litigated more than efficient laws. In other words, the economic 
version of the case-selection hypothesis is based upon probability. 
A second theory that concludes that judge-made law progresses 
consistently toward a goal comes from legal theory. In the context of le-
67 Paul Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977); see also 
George Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 
(1977); John Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of the Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 393 (1978). 
68 In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. I (9 Wheat. I) (1824), the State of New York granted the 
exclusive right to steamboat navigation in New York waters to a partnership that transferred this 
monopoly to Ogden. When Gibbons began a competing service between New York and New Jer-
sey, Ogden sued Gibbons, who defended on grounds that the state-granted monopoly violated the 
"commerce clause" of the U.S. Constitution. Chief Justice John Marshall, speaking for the Supreme 
Court, did not invoke the commerce clause but held that the monopoly was invalid because it con-
flicted with a federal statute. If such state-sponsored monopolies were valid, interstate commerce 
would be burdened and economic activity would be sharply reduced. This case is an example of an 
inefficient law that was challenged; overturning it increased efficiency. 
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gal rationality, the process of selective litigation causes judge-made law 
to move toward legal rules of law of optimum generality: they are neither 
over-inclusive (stare decisis constrains judges from over-inclusive rules 
so as to preserve their freedom in future cases, as discussed in Section 
IV.B) nor under-inclusive (if narrow rules of case law are nested within 
broader rules, judges are constrained from using arbitrary, under-
inclusive rules, as discussed in Section IY.C). The legal theory has two 
key assumptions. First, "hard" cases are more likely to be litigated than 
"easy" cases. Easy cases fall clearly within an uncontroversial legal 
category or rule of law, usually are not litigated or are disposed of at 
trial, and often do not reach the highest appellate courts. "Hard" cases 
are "interstitial"; that is, they fall in the "cracks" between rules oflaw, or 
involve arguably over-inclusive or under-inclusive categories or rules. 
Hard cases usually reach the highest appellate courts for decision. 
Legal theory also assumes that judges decide cases according to 
precedent, which requires them to decide like cases alike. Through se-
lective litigation, hard cases rise to the top of the judicial pyramid, result-
ing in appellate decisions that provide guidance to lower courts, the legal 
profession, and citizens through the principle of precedent. Hard cases 
challenge existing formulations of legal categories. Judges must fine-
tune the categories by broadening them or narrowing them to resolve 
hard cases. Over time, these repeatedly challenged legal categories ap-
proach an optimal level of generality.69 Moreover, as Levi stressed, the 
level of generality may change over time.70 
With respect to certain constitutional categories like free speech 
and the right to bear arms, some argue that there is no optimum level of 
generality that can provide a clear division between cases that should be 
decided one way from cases that should be decided the other way. For 
example, some who object to gun-control laws maintain there is no logi-
cal stopping point between any restrictions on guns and a total prohibi-
tion of guns. However, the essence of legal rationality is the ability to 
recognize similarity and difference and to optimize legal categories to 
separate cases that should be decided one way from those that should be 
69 However, there are some legal fields, such as business law, that require consistency and 
uniformity and cannot tolerate the slow process of reaching an ideal rule of law through selective 
litigation in multiple jurisdictions. These legal fields are ripe for legal codification by legislative 
enactment such as the Uniform Commercial Code for business law. In other fields of law, such as 
torts, we can conclude from the fact that it has not been codified that the common-law process of 
selective case adjudication produces acceptable results. 
70 LEVI, supra note I, at 8-27. Judges and lawyers often construct hypothetical cases in order 
to determine whether a rule of law is sufficiently general/robust to encompass the two cases as "like" 
or is sensitive to small (marginal) changes in abstract facts such that the two cases can be distin-
guished. This is law's version of sensitivity analysis. 
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decided the other way. Thus, this type of "slippery slope" argument is 
usually the last refuge of extremists. 71 
E. CONSISTENCY IN DECISIONS BY APPELLATE PANELS OF JUDGES 
Whether individuals employ economic rationality or legal rational-
ity, the transitivity property provides consistency in both rational deci-
sion processes. However, Kenneth Arrow showed that individual consis-
tency (transitivity) is not enough to guarantee that collective decisions by 
a group of individuals or a panel of judges, who make decisions by ma-
jority rule, will also be consistent (transitive). An "aggregation" problem 
can lead to inconsistent results. 
Given certain conditions,72 Kenneth Arrow proved that if individu-
als have economically rational preferences that are transitive (they obey 
Axioms EI-E2) but are otherwise unrestricted, groups of three or more 
persons may not be able to arrive at collectively transitive decisions by 
majority rule when there are three or more alternatives from which to 
choose and these alternatives are considered pairwise as in the example 
below. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem showed that unstable, pairwise 
cycling among the choices will occur. The following hypothetical ex-
ample illustrates the Theorem: Huey, Dewey, and Louie wish to accom-
pany each other to one of three entertainments: an art gallery, a baseball 
game, or a concert. The preferences of three persons are transitive but 
71 On its face, the nineteenth-century expansion of the concept of "imminently dangerous" 
appears to be an instance of a successful "slippery slope" argument: there seemed to be no logical 
stopping point from products like poisons and guns, to products like scaffolds, to ordinary products 
like coffee urns. But the expansion of the concept was accomplished by sleight of hand: the meaning 
of "imminently dangerous" had to be broadened continually until it included products like coffee 
urns, which are clearly not within any reasonable definition of the concept. If courts had retained a 
stable definition, e.g., products dangerous in ordinary use, the "slippery slope" argument would fail 
(the discussion of sensitivity analysis in the preceding footnote is also relevant here). So too, in dis-
cussions of gun control, the "slippery slope" argument is that banning assault rifles will lead to ban-
ning all guns. If the right to own guns is justified on grounds of self-protection or hunting, it takes a 
gross distortion of those legitimate purposes to include assault rifles, whose purpose is neither self-
defense nor hunting, but rather to inflict indiscriminate carnage on an indefinite number of people. 
Here too, the success of a "slippery slope" argument depends upon distortion of concepts or pur-
poses. Legal rationality is about the recognition of subtle similarities and subtle differences, and 
drawing dividing lines between cases that are subtly different. "Slippery slope" arguments, which 
conflate differences, are only possible if legal precision is ignored. 
72 1) "Unanimity" according to the Pareto improvement criterion; 2) "Nondictatorship," 
whereby no single individual may dictate society's choices; 3) "Range," whereby individuals may 
rank alternatives in any order they choose (unrestricted domain); 4) "Independence of Irrelevant Al-
ternatives," whereby the social choice between any two alternatives must depend only on the order-
ings of individuals over these two alternatives, and not on their orderings over other alternatives; and 
5) "Transitivity" of individual preferences. KENNETH ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL 
VALVES ch. III (conditions), ch. V (theorem) (2d ed. 1963); DAVID BARNES & LYNN STOUT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 451-52 (1992). 
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have ''unrestricted domains;" that is, there are no restrictions on the order 
in which individuals may rank alternatives. 
For Huey: art >- baseball >- concert; 
for Dewey: baseball >- concert >- art; 
for Louie: concert >- art >- baseball. 
If Huey, Dewey, and Louie attempt to choose an entertainment by 
a series of pairwise votes, unstable cycling will result. If they must 
choose between art or baseball, a majority (Huey and Louie) will prefer 
art; if they must choose between baseball and a concert, a majority (Huey 
and Dewey) will prefer baseball; and if they must choose between a con-
cert and art, a majority (Dewey and Louie) will prefer a concert.73 Even 
though the preferences of each person are individually transitive, they are 
not collectively transitive. This "aggregation" problem occurs when the 
domain of preferences remains unrestricted. 
Practically speaking, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem means that 
even if every judge on an appellate panel is individually rational, a group 
decision made by majority rule, where judges have widely divergent 
views, may be unstable over time (precedents may be overturned) due to 
changes in personnel, how alternative choices are framed, or who con-
trols the agenda. However, when appellate judges have relatively ho-
mogenous preferences, unstable precedents are less likely to occur. For 
example, when considering commercial disputes, most judges tend to 
have values that are consistent with efficient markets, and a series of 
commercial appellate decisions will likely be consistent. On the other 
hand, controversial social issues, such as abortion and gun control, about 
which preferences are more likely to be heterogeneous and extreme, will 
likely cause unstable cycling and generate inconsistent decisions. Due to 
recent changes in personnel on the U.S. Supreme Court, such cycling 
may be occurring, resulting in irrational group decisions.74 
73 Barnes & Stout, supra note 72 at 451. 
74 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 191 (2007) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) ("Though today's 
opinion does not go so far as to discard Roe or Casey, the Court, differently composed than it was 
when we last considered a restrictive abortion regulation, is hardly faithful to our earlier invocations 
of 'the rule oflaw' and the 'principles of stare decisis."'). 
29
Cirace: When Are Law and Economics Isomorphic?
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2009
212 GOLDENGATEUNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 39 
v. WHEN ARE ECONOMIC RATIONALITY AND LEGAL RATIONALITY 
ISOMORPHIC? 
This section answers the second and third questions posed by this 
article: 75 What is the relation between economic rationality and legal ra-
tionality in judicial decisions? And when economics and law conflict, 
should economics trump law? 
Five examples illustrate the relationship between economic ration-
ality and legal rationality. One example is concerned with judicial deci-
sions in entrapment cases; two examples discuss the potential conflict be-
tween efficiency and distributional equity in the market structures of 
perfect competition and bilateral monopoly; and two examples are con-
cerned with the conflict between fundamental rights and security. 
These five examples support the tentative conclusion that in cases 
in which judges are willing to balance interests through marginal trade-
offs, economic rationality dominates. Economic rationality and legal ra-
tionality will often be isomorphic because judges will tend to interpret 
legal concepts consistently with economic concepts. In such cases, a 
correspondence rule maps each rationality into the other so as to preserve 
properties and relations in both. For example, in the law of torts, when 
judges use the Judge Hand test in negligence cases, all cases that satisfy 
the binary relation (B < PL) ::::) ("negligence") also satisfy the Judge Hand 
test and belong in the legal category of negligence, and the converse is 
also true. Similarly, in all cases that satisfy the binary relation (B ~ PL) 
::::) ("due care"), the actions do not constitute negligence, and the converse 
is also true. 
However, when judges employ legal rationality as the dominant 
rationality, as in cases involving fundamental rights, which are discussed 
below, mapping their decision from legal rationality to economic ration-
ality is usually not possible. The two rationalities will usually be neither 
isomorphic nor consistent. 
A. ENTRAPMENT CASES: ECONOMICS AND LAW ARE NEARLY 
ISOMORPHIC 
Sometimes judges appear to reason in terms of legal rationality, 
which determines whether a particular case is included or excluded 
within a particular concept (e.g., the nineteenth-century product-liability 
cases), when actually they implicitly balance interests using economic 
rationality. Six U.S. Supreme Court cases and a number of appellate 
7S The first question is, what does thinking like a lawyer (or a judge) mean and how does it 
differ from thinking like an economist? 
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cases involving entrapmene6 seem to exemplify the hidden use of eco-
nomic rationality. In these cases, the courts purported to use the "objec-
tive (or subjective) predisposition test" to determine whether a defendant 
had been entrapped. The predisposition test is a legal categories test. 
However, most of the cases were decided consistently with a balancing 
of two competing interests: the government's need for entrapment based 
on the seriousness of the crime, and the nature and extent of government 
involvement in the entrapment. In extreme cases, little government need 
for entrapment along with repeated and prolonged government involve-
ment led to acquittal as a matter of law. Similarly, great government 
need for entrapment along with simple solicitation led to conviction as a 
matter of law. In cases where reasonable persons could differ as to the 
balancing of interests, the courts asked juries to decide. Courts may have 
been using the interest-balancing test surreptitiously. 77 Most of the en-
trapment cases could have been decided the same way under either a 
predisposition test or a balancing-of-competing-interests test. 
However, one appellate entrapment case78 was a clear exception. 
This case showed that although entrapment law and economic rationality 
may be consistent with each other, they are not quite isomorphic because 
judicial decisions based on economic efficiency can come into conflict 
with the legal rationality goal of distributional equity. Economic ration-
ality has one overarching goal: efficiency. Legal rationality has several 
broad goals in addition to efficiency, such as due process and equity 
(both horizontal and distributional). To meet the requirements of due 
process or distributional equity, a decision may have to be economically 
inefficient and thus conflict with economic rationality. 
76 John Cirace, An Interest Balancing Test/or Entrapment, 18 PACE L. REv. 51 (1997). 
77 Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 560 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The crux 
of the Court's concern in this case is that the Government went too far and abused the process of 
detection and enforcement by luring an innocent person to violate the law.") (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
78 In Carbajal-Portillo v. u.s., 396 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1968), one defendant traveled 1,000 
miles to the U.S. border to bring heroin into the country. When his contact, who was a narcotics 
agent, asked him to take the heroin across the border, he refused, sensing a trap. He returned to Mex-
ico and met a local resident who agreed to take the heroin across the border. After crossing the bor-
der, both defendants were arrested. Using the "objective predisposition test," the court said that first 
defendant was entrapped as a matter of law because his reluctance had to be overcome; the agent 
affirmatively persuaded him to commit the crime. As to the local resident, he was willingly disposed 
to break the law. However, under a balancing-of-interests test, the government's need for entrapment 
to stem the flow of illegal drugs is substantial and the extent and nature of government involvement 
is well within acceptable bounds, so both convictions should have been sustained. 
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B. ECONOMICS AND LAW ARE OFTEN ISOMORPHIC IN CASES INVOLVING 
MARKETS 
In perfectly competitive markets, questions of efficiency and dis-
tributional equity can be separated. Markets fulfill efficiency conditions, 
and government can achieve distributional equity without interfering 
with the markets through transfers from taxes. When government inter-
feres with perfectly competitive markets to achieve distributional equity, 
markets become inefficient. Similarly, if a court's goal is distributional 
equity, legal rationality and economic rationality will be neither consis-
tent nor isomorphic. On the other hand, if a court adopts the goal of effi-
ciency as its guide in cases involving competitive markets, law and eco-
nomics will be isomorphic because judges will tend to interpret legal 
concepts consistently with economic concepts. 
However, in the context of bilateral monopoly,19 efficiency and 
distributional equity are interrelated and not easily separable. The bar-
gaining version of the Coase Theorem, which is the foundation theorem 
of law and economics, is a good example of a bilateral monopoly. The 
bargaining version of the Coase Theorem is usually stated as follows: if 
property rights are clearly specified and transactions costs are zero, then 
bargaining between those who have property rights specified in their fa-
vor and those who do not will result in an efficient allocation of re-
sources. 
In the famous article The Problem of Social Cost,80 Coase com-
pared a property-right regime to a liability-rule regime, as defined by 
Judge Calabresi and Melemand's well-known distinction between prop-
erty rights and liability rules. 81 The property-right regime had no liabil-
79 Monopoly is a market in which there is only one seller; monopsony is a market with only 
one buyer. A bilateral monopoly is a market in which there is only one buyer and one seller. An ex-
ample would be negotiation in a coal mining town between the only coal mine company and the only 
labor union.,Many lawsuits can be analyzed as bilateral monopolies because the plaintiff and defen-
dant must deal with each other and no others, much like the coal mine example. The ubiquity of bi-
lateral monopoly is emphasized in RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 
1998). Bilateral monopoly is an economic market structure that can be used to analyze many one-
on-one lawsuits. 
80 Ronald Coase, The Problem a/Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. I (\ 960). 
81 See Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena-
bility: One View a/the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1089-93, 1106-11 (\972). If one's legal 
entitlement to something, sayan automobile, is protected by a "property right," another party who 
wants to transfer the legal entitlement to herself must pay a price that is acceptable to the person who 
currently owns the legal entitlement to the property. If one's legal entitlement to something is pro-
tected only by a "liability rule," another party may destroy this entitlement and compensate the other 
party by paying a price that is determined by a court. For example, if an automobile is destroyed in a 
collision due to the other party's negligence, a court will determine compensation. A legal entitle-
ment protected by a property right is worth significantly more than a legal entitlement protected by a 
mere liability rule. A property right gives a person much more bargaining power than a liability rule. 
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ity for crop damage and the parties could bargain freely without court in-
tervention. The liability-rule regime provided judicially determined 
monetary damages for crop damages. Under the liability-rule regime, 
courts could constrain the amount of compensation a party could de-
mand. The property-right regime did not limit a party's right to bargain 
for entitlement. 
Coase's theorem can be illustrated by his now-famous crops-cattle 
example. Assume that one steer brings in a profit of $0.50 to a cattleman 
and that a trespassing steer causes $1.00 worth of crop damage to the 
farmer. Under a liability rule, the cattleman will not keep the steer be-
cause he would sustain a $0.50 loss after paying $1 in damages. 
Under a no-liability/property-right legal regime in which the cat-
tleman does not have to pay for crop damage, he can allow his cattle to 
freely trespass on the farmer's property unless the farmer pays the cat-
tleman enough to warrant disposal of the steer: a minimum of $0.50. 
This will cost the farmer less than the $1.00 crop damage she will suffer 
if the cattleman keeps the steer. The difference between the cost of crop 
damage ($1.00) and the cost of losing a profitable steer ($0.50) is the co-
operative surplus, and is the range within which the parties can bargain 
to obtain an efficient result. Whether the price is closer to $0.50 or 
closer to $1.00 depends on how hard each of the parties bargains. Under 
both legal regimes, the efficient or "invariant" result, no steer, occurs. 
However, the distribution of income is quite different. Under the liabil-
ity for damages rule, the cattleman earns $0 profit and the farmer earns 
$1 profit because her crops are not trampled. Under the no-liability for 
damages regime, the two parties bargain to reach an agreed-upon result, 
distributing the profit between them: the cattleman profits $0.50-$1.00 
and the farmer's profit of$1.00 is reduced by that amount. 
The extortion and bilateral monopoll2 inherent in the bargaining 
version of Coase's Theorem as illustrated above become much more se-
vere when one contrasts two property-right regimes. Suppose the farmer 
in Coase's crops-cattle example has an entitlement to have crops free 
from damage by trespassing cattle. That entitlement is protected by a 
property right. Violation of the property right is the tort of "trespass," 
which is enforceable by injunction, as opposed to monetary damages for 
crop destruction under the liability rule. The "invariance" conclusion 
that the result (no steer) will be the same regardless of the property rule 
cannot be sustained. 
[d. 
82 Bilateral monopoly involves disputes over the distribution of the cooperative surplus-
how the $0.50 is to be divided-which could prevent the parties from achieving the efficient result 
through bargaining. 
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For example, assume one steer brings in a profit of $1.50 to the 
cattleman, and that the trespassing steer causes $1.00 worth of crop dam-
age to the farmer. If the cattleman pays the farmer damages under a li-
ability rule, he will still profit $0.50 from the trespassing steer, which re-
sults in a net social gain. However, under the property-right regime, the 
farmer can get an injunction prohibiting the steer from trespassing on her 
land. In response, the cattleman has three options: build a fence, bargain 
to remove the injunction, or do without the profitable steer. If the cost of 
building the fence is $4.00, the farmer could demand up to $4.00 from 
the cattleman as the price of not enforcing the injunction. Under these 
circumstances, the costs of building the fence or bargaining to remove 
the injunction are greater than the value of the steer, so the cattleman 
would do without the steer and any profit. The property-right rule would 
have an inefficient result, because the cattleman would forgo the steer, 
losing $1.50 in profit to rectify only $1.00 in crop damage, resulting in a 
net social loss of $0.50. 
The flaw in the bargaining version of the Coase Theorem is that it 
assumes cooperative bargaining, which is contrary to economic rational-
ity's fundamental assumption that individuals are self-interested. As in 
the above example, bargaining may break down between self-interested 
individuals over their inability to agree upon the division of the coopera-
tive surplus.83 In the context of bilateral monopoly, if a self-interested 
party has a property right specified in its favor, it has a great deal of bar-
gaining (monopoly) power, and bargaining will likely result in inefficient 
and distributionally inequitable solutions. Judicial intervention or the 
threat of it in such cases, such as possible alteration of property rights, 
shift to a liability rule, or equitable relief, will likely enhance both effi-
ciency and distributional equity. 84 Thus, in the context of bilateral mo-
nopoly, economic rationality and legal rationality are likely to be consis-
tent and isomorphic.85 
83 Robert Cooter, The Cost ojCoase, II 1. LEGAL STUD. I, 17,23 (1982). 
84 In the famous case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219 (1970), plaintiff 
homeowners asked for an injunction against injury to their property from dirt, smoke and vibration 
emanating from a nearby cement plant. The court said that total damage to plaintiffs' property was 
relatively small ($185,000) in comparison to the value of defendant's factory (investment in excess 
of $45,000,000) and to the consequences of the injunction. In asking for an injunction, the plaintiffs 
asked the court to protect their entitlement to clean air by a property right; that is, plaintiffs wanted 
the right to demand that the cement company cease operating unless it paid a price satisfactory to 
them. The court departed from its long settled doctrine of granting an injunction where a nuisance 
has been found and substantial damage shown, because it did not want to give the plaintiffs enor-
mous bargaining power over defendants. It denied the injunction (property right) and substituted a 
damage remedy (liability rule). In many cases involving bilateral monopoly, a court can fashion a 
damage remedy that both gives the defendant an efficient incentive to minimize the nuisance and is 
distributionally equitable to the plaintiff. 
85 In competitive markets, no one has any bargaining power because everyone has alternative 
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C. ECONOMICS AND LAW CONFLICT IN CASES INVOLVING 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
Law and economics are usually neither isomorphic nor consistent 
in cases involving the conflict between personal liberty and public safety. 
One example concerns the interpretation of the exclusionary rule for evi-
dence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. A conflict arises be-
tween judges who use economic rationality to balance interests through 
marginal trade-offs and judges who use legal rationality, which involves 
a determination of whether the rule of law in one case is a binding prece-
dent that includes the facts of another case. 
In Weeks v. United States (1914),86 the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition 
against unreasonable searches and seizures must be excluded in a federal 
trial. The Court reasoned that to admit such evidence would put a judi-
cial stamp of approval on unconstitutional conduct. This exclusionary 
rule was extended to state trials in Mapp v. Ohio (1961).87 However, in 
United States v. Leon (1984),88 the Court, 6-3, held that the exclusionary 
rule should be modified to allow the use of evidence obtained by officers 
acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a magistrate, 
although the warrant was ultimately found to be unsupported by probable 
cause. The majority reasoned that the exclusionary rule is "a judicially 
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights gener-
ally through its deterrent effect," the applicability of which "must be re-
solved by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the use" of ille-
gally seized evidence.89 The dissenters questioned whether the 
exclusionary rule is merely a "judicially created remedy" for Fourth 
Amendment violations, subject to being narrowed "through guesswork 
about deterrence" rather than, as indicated in Weeks, "a right grounded in 
that Amendment to prevent the government from subsequently making 
use of any evidence so obtained.,,90 
The majority in Leon engaged in economic rationality. They were 
willing to consider the marginal trade-offs of protecting Fourth Amend-
persons with whom to deal. Judicial intervention in such markets for reasons of distributional equity 
will always result in inefficiency. However, in bilateral monopoly situations, where one side has a 
great deal of bargaining power because the legal rule or regime greatly favors one party, judicial 
intervention as in Boomer, discussed in the previous footnote, can enhance both efficiency and dis-
tributional equity. 
86 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,394 (1914). 
87 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.s. 643 (1961). 
88 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
89 Jd. at 906-07 (emphasis added). 
90 Jd. at 943 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see WAYNE LAFAVE & JEROLD ISRAEL, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 105-11 (2d ed. 1992). 
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ment rights and the probability of convicting a guilty defendant. To 
move from Weeks-Mapp to Leon, the majority must have believed that 
society's gain through the increased probability of convicting a guilty de-
fendant was as least as great as the resulting loss of protection against 
unreasonable search and seizure. Otherwise the majority would not have 
modified the rule. Since, for the majority, the gain from the rule of law 
in Leon outweighs the potential loss from not adhering to the rule of law 
in Weeks-Mapp, the rule oflaw in Leon is at least weakly preferred to the 
rule of law in Weeks-Mapp, i.e., Leon:>- Weeks-Mapp. 
On the other hand, the dissenters employed legal rationality and 
were not willing to engage in marginal trade-offs. For them, Weeks-
Mapp stands for a rule of law: evidence seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures must 
be excluded in a federal trial. In Leon, the warrant allowing the seizure 
was without probable cause; therefore, the seizure violated the Fourth 
Amendment and must be excluded. In other words, for the dissenters, 
Weeks-Mapp is a binding precedent that includes the facts of Leon, i.e., 
Weeks-Mapp =:> Leon. 
An alternative interpretation91 of the dissenters' view in Leon is 
that the dissenters may have believed that Weeks-Mapp established a 
minimum level of Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 
search and seizure. Since Leon reduces Fourth Amendment protection 
below that level, the decision is impermissible. This interpretation of the 
dissenter's view is known as a Rawlsian lexical constraint on trade-
offs.92 
The measures for protection of national security that the U.S. gov-
ernment has taken in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, make the constitutional changes in Leon seem insignificant. In a 
recent book, Judge Posner supports the government's "marginal adjust-
ments,,93 that must be made by "practical-minded judges" to constitu-
tional rights that "impinge" on the measures taken for protection of pub-
lic safety in a national emergency. He characterized these adjustments as 
"sui generis," neither war nor crime. These "marginal adjustments" in-
clude: the length of indefinite detention of suspected terrorists deter-
mined by cost-benefit analysis, coercive interrogation, authorization for 
public officers to disregard in extreme cases the prohibition against tor-
ture, an extremely narrow definition of torture, warrantless surveillance, 
91 John Cirace, Law and Economics: An Interdisciplinary Approach ch. 4 (2008) (unpub-
lished materials on file with author). 
92 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 42-43 (1971). Serial or "lexical" ordering ofprinci-
pies or interest is an ordering or ranking that requires the first principle in the ordering to be satisfied 
before moving on to the second principle, and so on. [d. 
93 POSNER, supra note 7 at I. 
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advocacy of an Official Secrets Act, and an end to the "'prior restraints' 
taboo with respect to publications.,,94 Although critics95 have called 
them sweeping changes, Posner asserts that these adjustments are justi-
fied, 
by balancing the anticipated consequences of alternative outcomes and 
picking the one that creates the greatest preponderance of good over 
bad effects .... Unfortunately, the "weighing" is usually metaphori-
cal. The consequences judges consider are imponderable, and the 
weights assigned to them are therefore inescapably subjective .... 
[Judges who resist this weighing] are in thrall to precedents that were 
either unsound when created or have become obsolete due to changed 
political, social, economic, or technological circumstances .... 
To weigh the unweighable is at once a contradiction and an inescap-
able duty96 
Whether or not Posner is correct, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to 
ensure that civil liberties will not be compromised during sui generis na-
tional emergencies. That the weighing is "metaphorical" gives one little 
confidence that such "subjective" and speculative weighing can distin-
guish a sui generis emergency from one that is like prior emergencies. 
The logic of legal rationality, which relies on the recognition of 
similarities and differences between past and present cases, may be more 
accurate than the logic of economic rationality based on a metaphorical 
weighing. Legal rationality and economic rationality involve different 
methods, have different goals, and stem from two different logical sys-
tems. In cases involving fundamental rights, legal and economic ration-
alities are usually untranslatable rather than consistent and isomorphic. 
When law and economics conflict over fundamental rights, there is no a 
priori reason to think that speculative economics should trump the law. 
Such conflicts have to be resolved by asking which abstract logical 
model, economics or law, more accurately explains experience in the real 
world. This is a matter of judgment over which reasonable persons can 
and do differ. 
94 Id. at 64, 80, 86, 87, 95-103, 108-10. 
95 See. e.g., David Cole, How to Skip the Constitution, 53 THE N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS No. 
18 (Nov. 16, 2008); Michiko Kakutani, A Jurist's Argument for Bending the Constitution, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 19,2006). 
96 Posner, supra note 7. at 24, 28, 66. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The paper asks the question, how does thinking like a lawyer (or a 
judge) differ from thinking like an economist? The article answers that 
question by giving a formal description of both economic rationality and 
legal rationality in terms of two axioms and their symbolic interpretation 
as binary relations. It shows that economic and legal reasoning involve 
different logical operations. 
In the model oflegal rationality, the role of precedent is crucial in 
determining whether there are constraints on judges' decisions. If legal 
rationality's rules of case law are discrete and unrelated to each other, 
precedent is weak and fails to effectively constrain judicial decisions. 
When legal rationality's rules of case law are nested (completely in-
cluded) within broader rules of law such as due process, equity, or equal 
protection, precedent is strong and provides adequate constraint against 
arbitrary decisions by judges. 
Legal rationality and economic rationality are separate and co-
equal rational decision processes. Economic and legal rationality have 
two usual relationships. When judges balance competing interests 
through marginal trade-offs, economic rationality dominates. Under 
these circumstances economic rationality and legal rationality will have 
an isomorphic relationship, or close to it, because economic concepts can 
be mapped onto relevant legal concepts, and judges will tend to interpret 
the legal concepts in a way that preserves the properties and results in 
both disciplines. However, if judges employ legal rationality as the 
dominant rationality, legal rationality and economic rationality are rarely 
isomorphic or consistent, because legal concepts cannot be mapped onto 
economic concepts. 
When thinking like an economist and thinking like a lawyer con-
flict, as they often do in cases involving fundamental rights, economists 
often assert that economic rationality should trump legal rationality; 
however there is no a priori reason why this should be. The two ration-
alities result in irreconcilably opposing views. Such conflicts should not 
be resolved by blindly forcing one rationality upon the analysis. Instead, 
judges should consider which abstract logical model, economics or law, 
more accurately explains experience in the real world. 
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